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ABSTRACT
Randomized controlled clinical trials, leading to large-scale meta-analyses,
are considered the gold standard for research evaluating new drugs and
other therapeutic interventions.Topromote scientific integrity andprevent
the adoption of potentially fallacious early trends, emerging information is
commonly shielded from sponsors, investigators, and other clinical trial ac-
tors, including through the use of independent Data and SafetyMonitoring
Boards (DSMBs). Once established, a DSMB is usually the only body to
have access to unblinded information until trial completion or the cross-
ing of pre-specified, and often highly stringent, stopping boundaries. Yet,
in certain circumstances, clinical trial actors have legal obligations to trial
participants and others to use or disclose emerging information.
This paper canvasses potential legal obligations to use or disclose emerg-
ing clinical trial data, including through tort law and securities laws. The
analysis is supplemented by a comprehensive search of US cases in which
courts have adjudicated upon such allegations. Notably, available cases
demonstrate widespread judicial deference to clinical trial practices de-
signed to shield clinical trial actors from emerging information. As a result,
despite a theoretical possibility of legal obligations of use or disclosure, it
appears that these will rarely be enforceable.
KEYWORDS: Clinical Trials, Confidentiality, Data Monitoring Commit-
tees, Disclosure, Liability, Monitoring
1. INTRODUCTION
In Apr. 1992, a clinical trial started enrolling women at a high risk for breast cancer.
For the first time, a major, multi-center clinical trial would assess whether a breast can-
cer treatment drug (tamoxifen citrate) could be effective in preventing breast cancer.
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By 1997, almost 14,000 women had enrolled in the study. Half were randomized to
receive tamoxifen, the rest placebo.The two funding agencies, the National Cancer In-
stitute and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute set up a committee to moni-
tor, among other things, study safety and efficacy.The trial’s Data and Safety Monitor-
ing Board (DSMB)1 first saw efficacy data in Mar. 1995. Of the 106 breast cancers so
far diagnosed, 70 were in women assigned to receive placebo, and 36 were in women
receiving tamoxifen. Although the information seemed favorable to the tamoxifen-
treated group, it was not sufficient to cross the pre-specified ‘stopping boundary’, i.e.,
the point at which emerging trial results were considered sufficiently conclusive to pre-
clude clinical equipoise between the trial arms. As the study continued, it was increas-
ingly clear that there was a lower incidence of breast cancer diagnoses in participants
receiving tamoxifen than those receiving placebo. By the third DSMB review in Mar.
1997, the DSMB identified approximately 50 per cent reduction in invasive breast can-
cer incidence among women randomized to tamoxifen, with a statistically significant
P value of 0.000011: that is, a likelihoodof 1 in 10,000of the differences in breast cancer
reduction between the two armshaving occurred by chance alone.Despite this clear ev-
idence of the intervention’s preventative effect, the DSMB voted to continue the study
in order to find out more about potential long-term adverse effects. InMar. 1998, with
an even strongerP-value,2 theDSMB recommended that the study be stopped and par-
ticipants unblinded.3
By all accounts, the DSMB performed its monitoring role thoughtfully and deliber-
ately, ensuring ongoing trial validity in a context of intense public, media, and govern-
mental scrutiny. Yet, for at least two years before the trial was terminated, the efficacy
of tamoxifen in preventing breast cancer in high-risk women was essentially incontro-
vertible. The confidential nature of DSMB deliberations meant that no indication of
efficacy was available to investigators or study participants. Had the information been
disclosed, it would likely have changed the willingness of many participants to remain
in the trial—particularly given tamoxifen was already in themarket and therefore avail-
able off-label: presumably a preferable position than continuing in a study involving a
50 per cent chance of receiving placebo.
Now consider a clinical trial sponsored by the publicly listed company NewLink
Genetics Corp (‘NewLink’). The company’s most advanced treatment candidate was
a vaccine intended to treat pancreatic cancer. NewLink developed a phase 3 clinical
trial designed to pursue marketing approval. The IMmunotherapy for Pancreatic RE-
Sectable cancer Study (IMPRESS), which commenced in May 2010, was structured
around four major milestones, the first being recruitment of all 722 participants, the
second, third, and fourth being periodic DSMB review after pre-specified numbers of
1 For the sake of clarity, in this article, the termData and SafetyMonitoring Board (DSMB)will be used to cap-
ture all bodies established with the function of performing an independent and ongoing review of emerging
trial data. In the Breast Cancer Prevention Trial, this body was named the Endpoint Review, SafetyMonitor-
ing and Advisory Committee (ERSMAC).
2 At this point, theP-value for efficacy reachedP<0.000006: that is, a chanceof 6 in 100,000of havingoccurred
by chance alone.
3 Carol K. Redmond, Joseph P. Constantino & Theodore Colton, Challenges in Monitoring the Breast Can-
cer Prevention Trial, in Data Monitoring in Clinical Trials: A Case Studies Approach 118-135 (David L.
DeMets, Curt D. Furberg, & Lawrence M. Friedman eds., 2006), http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/
PublicView.do?ptiID=302575 (last visited Apr 5, 2013).
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participant deaths. Each DSMB review permitted study termination if the overall sur-
vival of treatment group participants exceeded that of control arm participants at a req-
uisite level of statistical significance.4 Otherwise, the study was to continue.
After the first interim analysis, the DSMB recommended that the trial continue.
NewLink explained to investors that trial continuation was an ‘anticipated outcome’,
and that they ‘look[ed] forward to continuing the study and to gathering additional,
more mature data in support of [NewLink’s] mission to provide improved treatment
options for patients with pancreatic cancer’.5 Similarly, after the second interim analy-
sis, NewLink issued a press release announcing that the DSMB found that the results
again did not justify seeking marketing approval, again making statements signaling an
expectation of clinical and commercial success. In May 2016, NewLink reported that
the IMPRESS trial did not achieve its primary endpoint, whichwas a statistically signif-
icant difference in overall survival between the treatment and control arms. More con-
cerningly, final trial results reported that the treatment arm had a three-month lower
survival time than the control arm. Investors brought class action proceedings claiming
that company had made fraudulent misstatements to them.6
The above scenarios raise a wealth of questions—What are the ethical principles
that should govern trial stopping decisions? What should be the roles and qualifica-
tions of the persons entrusted withmaking these decisions? Should there be additional
accountabilitymechanisms to oversee trial stopping decisions?This article focuses only
on one part of this landscape: the potential legal obligations of clinical trial actors to dis-
close or otherwise act upon emerging trial information. For the purpose of this analysis,
the category of clinical trial actors is conceptualized broadly to include sponsor compa-
nies, universities, hospitals, individual researchers, and reviewing Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs).7 Although no litigation has so far been brought against them, DSMBs
could also fall within this list of potential defendants.
Part two of this article provides contextual information on clinical trial monitoring,
including the growing prevalence of independent DSMBs to provide expert, ongoing
assessment of potentially emergent safety or efficacy signals.Most notably,modern trial
monitoring practices commonly involves the siloing of the vast preponderance of in-
terim trial data within DSMBs until such time as the data reaches stringent thresholds
for statistical certainty.That is, sponsors and researchers have no access to this data un-
til those thresholds are reached.The rationales for this confidentiality are well defined:
to protect a trial’s scientific integrity, as well as to prevent trial sponsors, investigators,
and/or participants from the potentially premature adoption of trial results. However,
the resultant informational asymmetriesmayalsopreventother clinical trial actors from
satisfying obligations to disclose or otherwise act upon emerging trial information. Part
three canvasses these potential legal claims that may be brought against clinical trial
4 At 222 deaths, approximately a 99.5 per cent likelihood that algenpantucel-L patients were outliving control
group patients because of theNewLink treatment orP-value of 0.004; at 33 deaths aP-value of 0.019, or about
a 98 per cent likelihood; at 444 patient deaths, a P-value of 0.043, or about 95.5 per cent likelihood: Amended
Class Action Complaint For Violations Of Federal Securities Laws, Nguyen v. New Link Genetics Corp., No.
1:16-CV-3545-WHP (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 2016)
5 Nguyen v New Link Genetics Corporation, 297 F.Supp.3d 472 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018).
6 Id.
7 MichelleM.Mello,DavidM. Studdert&TroyenA.Brennan,TheRise of Litigation inHumanSubjects Research,
139 ANN. INTERN. MED. 40 (2003).
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actors for failure to disclose or otherwise act upon clinical trial data, including lack of
informed consent, negligent conduct, product liability, fraud, and breach of contract.
For trials sponsored by publicly listed companies, non-disclosure alsomight constitute
securities fraud.
Evident in part three is a disconnection between legal actions that include poten-
tial obligations on clinical trial actors to use or disclose interim trial data, and clinical
trial practices directed towardmaintaining the confidentiality of interim trial data.Nav-
igating this divide will depend on the principles and values that judges determine to be
applicable, and the respective weight to which they should be accorded.8 To investi-
gate the manner in which judges have so far balanced these responsibilities, part four
sets out the results of a comprehensive search and analysis of US case law in which a
plaintiff has alleged an obligation for a clinical trial actor to have disclosed, or otherwise
acted upon, interim trial data. This provides an indication of the way in which courts
might use their discretion in cases going forwards. Part five draws lessons from these
cases to inform law and policy going forwards.
2. MONITORING CLINICAL TRIALS FOR EMERGING INFORMATION
2.1 AnObligation toMonitor EmergingTrial Safety and EfficacyData
Randomized controlled clinical trials, leading to large-scale meta-analyses, are consid-
ered the gold standard for research evaluating new drugs and other therapeutic inter-
ventions. The clinical trial process is typically long and complex, divided into roughly
four phases. Phase 1 trials enroll a small group of people to establish an intervention’s
safety in a participant population, including identification of a safe dosage range. Phase
2 trials enroll a larger group of participants to get additional information on safety and
preliminary efficacy information. Phase 2 trials typically last from severalmonths to two
years, and are often when a control group and potential blinding is introduced. Phase 3
trials provide more definitive information about the intervention’s safety and efficacy.
These usually enroll large groups of participants (from several hundred to several thou-
sand) and last from one to four years. Phase 4 trials are conducted after an intervention
has been marketed, to further monitor the intervention’s action in the general popu-
lation.9 Accordingly, an imperative to monitor ongoing trials for emerging safety or
efficacy signals—and to take action based upon such signals—increasingly has been
recognized.
Monitoring obligations extend to a variety of clinical trial actors, including clinical
trial sponsors, investigators, and reviewing IRBs (in some countries, termed research
ethics committees or human research ethics committees).Most pertinently, trial spon-
sors are required to regularly assess a trial’s emerging safety and efficacy profile. In the
US, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (21 CFR 312.56, Investigational New
Drug Application) sets out monitoring responsibilities for sponsors of clinical drug tri-
als. This includes ‘review[ing] and evaluat[ing] the evidence relating to the safety and
effectiveness of the drug’ and notifying the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
8 Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 359, 399 (1975).
9 Office of the FDA Commissioner, THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS - STEP 3: CLINICAL RESEARCH,
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/drugs/ucm405622.htm#Clinical Research Phase Studies (ac-
cessed Oct 26, 2018).
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participating investigators of potentially serious safety findings. The regulations spec-
ify that a sponsor who determines that an investigational drug ‘presents an unreason-
able and significant risk to subjects’ shall—within five working days of making such
determination—discontinue the relevant investigations, and notify the FDA, trial in-
vestigators, and reviewing IRBs.10 Additionally, 21 CFR 312.50 requires clinical drug
trial sponsors to ensure that the FDA and participating investigators ‘are promptly in-
formed of significant new adverse effects or risks with respect to the drug’.11 The Inter-
national Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use (ICH) Guideline for Good Clinical Practice extends this notification
obligation to all findings that ‘could affect adversely the safety of subjects, impact the
conduct of the trial, or alter the IRB/IEC’s approval/favorable opinion to continue the
trial’12
2.2 TheEmergence ofDSMBs as a Strategy for TrialMonitoring
Recognition of the need for regular monitoring of accumulating trial data, and of the
scientific and ethical benefits of independence in this monitoring role, has fostered the
establishmentofDSMBs: committees taskedwith assessing the appropriateness of con-
tinuing a clinical trial based on emerging trial data.13 DSMBs are required for all NIH-
funded multi-site clinical trials ‘involving interventions that entail potential risk to the
participants’.14 Additionally, under the Exception from Informed Consent Rule,15 an
independentDSMB ismandatory for emergency research trials seeking awaiver of sub-
ject’s informed consent.
In combination with considerable uptake in commercially sponsored trials, the
result is the establishment of DSMBs in many—and possibly most—clinical trials.
Jennifer Gewandter and her colleagues published a systematic review of randomized
controlled trials published in six high-impact, general medical journals in 2014, and as-
sessed the reported use of DSMBs. Out of 294 articles, 174 (59 per cent) mentioned
the use of a DSMB. Of the remaining 119 articles, 59 had advised of the intended
use of a DSMB in a clinical trials registry entry or a published protocol. Accordingly,
237 (81 per cent) of the trials reviewed likely included a DSMB.16 This is markedly
higher than reported in a 2004 review of clinical trials in similar high-impact med-
ical journals, which found the use of DSMBs in approximately 25 per cent of such
trials.17 This could be a function of expanding use of DSMBs over time, or it could
10 21 CFR 312.56(d).
11 Equivalent obligations for sponsors of clinical device trials are set out at 21 CFR 812.40 and 21 CFR 812.46.
12 International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH), GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE E6(R2) 5.16.2 (2016), https://www.ich.org/fileadmin/
Public Web Site/ICH Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E6/E6 R2 Step 4 2016 1109.pdf.
13 Califf RMMorse MA,Monitoring and ensuring safety during clinical research, 285 JAMA 1201–1205 (2001).
Thebackground andhistory ofDSMBs is further explained inLisaEckstein,Building aMoreConnectedDSMB:
Better Integrating Ethics Review and Safety Monitoring, 22 ACCOUNT. RES. 81, 105 (2015).
14 National Institutes of Health, NIH POLICY FOR DATA AND SAFETY MONITORING (1998), http://grants.nih.
gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not98-084.html (accessed Apr 25, 2013).
15 21 CFR 50.24(a).
16 Jennifer S. Gewandter et al., Reporting of data monitoring boards in publications of randomized clinical trials is
often deficient: ACTTION systematic review, 83 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 101, 107 (2017).
17 Matthew R. Sydes et al., Reported use of data monitoring committees in the main published reports of randomized
controlled trials: a cross-sectional study, 1 CLIN. TRIALS 48, 59 (2004). A similar figure was reported inMihaela
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reflect the more comprehensive search methodology conducted by Gewandter and
her colleagues, which included a search of published protocols and clinical trial reg-
istry entries for all published trials that failed to mention whether a DSMB had been
constituted.
The DSMB is appointed by, and principally advises, the trial sponsor on the ongo-
ing safety of trial participants and, often, whether the trial arms remain in a state of
clinical equipoise. Membership typically includes a small number of experts, includ-
ing clinicians in the relevant disease area and one or more statisticians.18 Most DSMBs
perform their monitoring functions in accordance with a written charter, often drafted
by the trial sponsor, or by the DSMB with subsequent agreement by the sponsor.19 In
its Guidance Document Establishment and Operation of Clinical Trial Data Monitoring
Committees for Clinical Trial Sponsors, the FDA advises that topics to be addressed in
such a charter
would normally include a schedule and format for meetings, format for presentation of
data, specification of who will have access to interim data and who may attend all or part
of [DSMB] meetings, procedures for assessing conflict of interest of potential [DSMB]
members, themethod and timing of providing interim reports to the [DSMB], and other
issues relevant to committee operations.20
2.3 Informational Asymmetries Resulting fromDSMBReview
Once a DSMB is established, with very limited exceptions, it is usually the only body
to have access to unblinded interim trial safety and efficacy data. Sponsors have re-
quirements to monitor trials for adverse events and, in certain cases, to inform reg-
ulators such as the FDA and trial investigators of such events either as individual
cases or in an aggregated form.21 While these safety reports will usually be unblinded,
the FDA has clarified that satisfying these requirements does not entail the need for
sponsors to unblind themselves to trial results more generally. The Agency explains
that:
Knowledge of the treatment received is necessary for interpreting [a serious adverse]
event, may be essential for the medical management of the subject, andmay provide crit-
ical safety information about a drug that could have implications for the ongoing conduct
of the trial (e.g.,monitoring, informed consent).TheAgency does not believe that unblinding
single or small numbers of serious and unexpected adverse event cases will compromise the in-
tegrity of the study, in part because such unblinding should be infrequent. (Emphasis added.)22
Stegert et al., An analysis of protocols and publications suggested that most discontinuations of clinical trials were
not based on preplanned interim analyses or stopping rules, 69 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 152, 160 (2016), which anal-
ysed the use of DSMBs in randomised clinical trial protocols approved by six research ethics committees in
Switzerland, Germany, and Canada between 2000 and 2003.
18 Sydes et al., supra note 17.
19 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL SPONSORS: ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES 4.3 (2006), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM127073.pdf (accessed Aug 13, 2013).
20 Id. at 4.3.
21 Safety reporting requirements are set out at 21 CFR 312.32.
22 Food andDrugAdministration, SAFETYREPORTINGREQUIREMENTSFORINDSANDBA/BESTUDIES 16 (2012),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM227351.pdf (accessed Nov 14, 2018).
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Trial investigators are also required to send emerging safety information
to reviewing IRBs, but again this information is limited in nature and often
not associated with the contextual information necessary for any meaningful
assessment.23
Tight control over the use and disclosure of interim data is essential to maintain a
trial’s scientific integrity, including forestalling any concerns that a trial’s sponsormight
seek to change aspects of a trial’s design to improve the chances of a positive finding.
This was an issue, for example, in the 2013 Light Study, which sought to assess the car-
diovascular risks associated with the anti-obesity drug Contrave. Although the study
was blinded and a DSMB established, a (initially) small team at the sponsor company
was given confidential access to interim data in order to file for FDA approval. At the
time of access (25 per cent of primary endpoint events), the interim data appeared
highly promising: if accurate, they would make Contrave one of the most effective car-
diovascular drugs in history.What followedwas awidespread leak of this information to
over 100 people, including members of the sponsor company’s board of directors who
had a financial interest in the outcome of the trial. As a consequence of the widespread
dissemination of unblinded data, and its potential to compromise trial integrity, the
FDA advised that the Light Study would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
characterizingContrave’s cardiovascular effects. Instead, anew trialwouldbeneeded.24
The Light Study’s Executive Steering Committee subsequently voted to terminate the
trial on the basis that ‘the premature release of interim data had compromised the sci-
entific integrity of the ongoing study’.25
Maintaining the confidentiality of interim trial data also prevents sponsors, trial
investigators, participants, and possible patients from prematurely adopting poten-
tially fallacious trial results; in particular, prior to an expert determination of statis-
tical and clinical significance.26 To illustrate, the 25 per cent results detailed in the
Light study disappeared once 50 per cent of primary endpoint events were analyzed.27
In another trial, which assessed the potential survival advantages of five courses, as
compared with four courses of chemotherapy for acute myeloid leukemia, interim
reviews suggested large survival benefits for the additional course. The trial DSMB
decided not to terminate the trial early for efficacy based on a lack of medical plausi-
bility for the magnitude of the treatment effect along with a lack of associated reduc-
tion in relapse risk and, therefore, a likelihood that it was the result of chance. By the
time the trial concluded, no survival differences were evident between the treatment
arms.28
23 David L. DeMets, Norman Fost & Madison Powers, An Institutional Review Board dilemma: responsible for
safety monitoring but not in control, 3 CLIN. TRIALS 142, 148 (2006); Eckstein, supra note 13.
24 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, SUMMARY REVIEW: APPLICATION NUMBER 200063ORIG1S000
(2014), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda docs/nda/2014/200063Orig1s000SumR.pdf (ac-
cessed Nov 15, 2018).
25 StevenE.Nissenet al.,Effect ofNaltrexone-Bupropion onMajorAdverseCardiovascularEvents inOverweight and
Obese Patients With Cardiovascular Risk Factors: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 315 JAMA 990, 1004 (2016).
26 Thomas R. Fleming, Susan Ellenberg & David L. DeMets, Monitoring clinical trials: issues and controversies
regarding confidentiality, 21 STAT. MED. 2843, 2851 (2002).
27 Nissen et al., supra note 25.
28 Keith Wheatley & David Clayton, Be skeptical about unexpected large apparent treatment effects:: the case of an
MRC AML12 randomization, 24 CONTROL. CLIN. TRIALS 66, 70 (2003).
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For the above reasons, extensive DSMB practices and procedures have developed
to limit the disclosure of emerging trial data. One common practice, for example, is
the use of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ sessions of DSMB meetings. Open sessions review the
general progress of the trial—for example, participant recruitment and data quality. In
addition to DSMBmembers, open sessions may be attended by trial investigators and
sponsor representatives. In comparison, unblinded efficacy and safety data is usually
analyzed only in closed DSMB meetings, with attendance restricted to DSMB mem-
bers and a trial statistician.29 The importance of confidentiality is emphasized in the
FDAGuidance for Clinical Trial Sponsors: Establishment and Operation of Clinical Trial
Data Monitoring Committees, which states that ‘Unblinded interim data and the results
of comparative interim analyses . . . should generally not be accessible by anyone other
than [DSMB]members or the statistician(s) performing these analyses and presenting
them to the [DSMB]’.30 A Health Technology Assessment commissioned by the UK
National Health Service on the use of DSMBs reported ‘near unanimity’ in the litera-
ture that interim data and DSMB deliberations should be kept confidential. It went on
to stress the need for breaches of confidentiality to be treated ‘extremely seriously’.31
2.4 Stopping Rules as the Parameters forDisclosure
As evident from the above, clinical trials pose something of an informational quandary.
On one hand, trial sponsors and investigators have ongoing obligations to ensure the
legal, ethical, and commercial acceptability of trials. On the other hand, modern clini-
cal trial practices shield sponsors and investigators from the vast majority of accruing
trial information, which instead is kept tightly locked within an independent DSMB.
‘Stopping rules’ provide a means of bridging these competing requirements.
As their name suggests, stopping rules specify the circumstances in which a DSMB
may alert a trial sponsor of information suggesting the need for early trial termination.
A threshold issue in this regard is the form of stopping rule(s) to be implemented, in-
cludingoneormoreof the following: ‘first, if the experimental treatment is clearly better
than the control; second, if it is clearly worse than the control; and third, if it is clearly
not going tobe shown tobebetter than the control’.32These canbe summarized as stop-
ping for efficacy, stopping for inferiority, and stopping for futility. Stopping rules also
can relate to ‘excess risk’ or other emerging adverse events, summarized as ‘stopping
for safety’. Stopping rules are commonly drafted by trial sponsors or investigators, and
agreed to by DSMBmembers, sponsors, and investigators.33 In a survey of researchers
and biostatisticians who had served on a DSMB, the vast majority of researchers (83.8
per cent) and biostatisticians (75 per cent) reported that the stopping rule had been
written into the trial protocol.34 The FDA and IRBs review data monitoring plans,
29 A M Grant et al., Issues in data monitoring and interim analysis of trials, 9 HEALTH TECHNOL. ASSESS. WINCH.
ENGL. 1, 238, iii–iv (2005); Eckstein, supra note 13.
30 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, supra note 19 at 10.
31 Grant et al., supra note 29 at 24.
32 JohnWhitehead, Stopping clinical trials by design, 3 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOV. 973, 974 (2004).
33 MatthewR. Sydes et al., Systematic qualitative review of the literature on data monitoring committees for random-
ized controlled trials, 1 CLIN. TRIALS 60, 79 (2004).
34 Patti M. Tereskerz et al., An Opinion and Practice Survey on the Structure and Management of Data and Safety
Monitoring Boards, 18 ACCOUNT. RES. 1, 30 (2011).
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including any specified stopping rules, as a part of their risk-benefit assessment, but the
criteria on which these plans are assessed is unclear.
Which stopping rules DSMBs operate within and the degree of specificity of these
rules has not been comprehensively catalogued. Nevertheless, at least some trials
have adopted extremely stringent boundaries, tightly constraining the circumstances
in which a DSMB would alert a trial sponsor or trial steering committee of emerging
trends. One such example is the Neonatal Oxygen Prospective Meta-analysis (NeO-
ProM) Collaboration: a set of five trials that collectively set out to compare the effects
of a loweroxygen-saturation target range (85 to89per cent) versus ahigher target range
(91 to 95 per cent) in extremely pre-term infants.35 Two of these protocols specified
that the DSMB should advise the trial steering committee of interim trial data if, in the
DSMB’s view, there is ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ of net clinical benefit or harm.
The protocols went on to specify that a difference of at least three standard deviations
in the interim analysis of a major endpoint may be needed to satisfy this threshold.36
An obligation on the DSMB to establish ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’—again
equated with a difference of greater than three standard deviations—also was included
in theHeart ProtectionStudy, reported in 2003.The stopping criterionwas basedon an
increase or decrease in all-cause mortality: the primary endpoint for the trial.37 Differ-
ences in secondary ‘majormorbidity’ outcomes such as non-fatalmyocardial infarction,
stroke, and revascularization were not incorporated. By the second year of the trial, sta-
tistically significant differences in thesemajormorbidity outcomes became apparent at
a level ofP< 0.001, 1.7 per cent absolute risk reduction (30 per cent relative risk reduc-
tion).Given these clear and compellingdifferences, commentators questionedwhether
the trial should have been stopped. On the one hand, this would have meant that the
trial would never have answered the question of mortality and had a greater potential
for type 1 (false positive) errors. On the other hand, Migrino and Topol noted that
from the perspective of subject safety and well-being, it does not appear to us that there
is any choice other than to includemajor morbidity adverse events as stopping criteria. It
is difficult to contemplate a compelling reason to continue a trial that has proven benefit
(or harm) ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (or its statistical correlate) in terms ofmajormor-
bidity such as myocardial infarction or stroke even if it means that the issue of mortality
effect is not established’.38
Further informational asymmetries can arise from a DSMB’s application of stop-
ping rules, particularly given the widely held position that the statistical boundaries
35 Notably, this group of studies was the subjective of considerable ethical controversy, including the adequacy
of the consent obtained from participants and the relative risks in comparative effectiveness research. See,
e.g., John D. Lantos, Learning the right lessons from the SUPPORT study controversy, 99 ARCH. DIS. CHILD. -
FETAL NEONATAL ED. F4, F5 (2014); Lois Shepherd, SUPPORT and Comparative Effectiveness Trials: What’s
at Stake?, 45HASTINGSCENT. REP. 44, 45 (2015); ALANR. FLEISCHMAN,TheControversy over SUPPORT
Continues and the Hyperbole Increases, 45 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 42, 44 (2015).
36 Outcomes of Two Trials of Oxygen-Saturation Targets in Preterm Infants, , 374 N. ENGL. J. MED. 749, 760
(2016), supplementary material.
37 Raymond Q Migrino & Eric J Topol, A matter of life and death? The Heart Protection Study and protection of
clinical trial participants, 24 CONTROL. CLIN. TRIALS 501, 505, 502 (2003).
38 Id. at 503.
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operate as guidelines rather than rules.39 In other words, it is often within the permissi-
ble discretion of a DSMB to recommend trial continuation even after emerging trial
data has reached a pre-specified stopping boundary. This was the case in the Breast
Cancer Prevention Trial, presented in part one.40 Other recently reported studies ex-
pressly acknowledge having progressed past a stopping boundary without the knowl-
edge of sponsors and/or investigators.41 ADSMBmay decide that trial continuation is
warranted, for example, to gain additional information about potential adverse effects
(e.g., the Breast Cancer Prevention Trial) or to obtain further information about sec-
ondary endpoints.42 John Lantos and Chris Feudtner explain these value-laden trade-
offs as core to the role of DSMBs:
There is no completely objective way to determine whether a study ought or ought not
to continue. If there were, then there would be no need for DSMBs. Instead, there would
be straightforward stopping rules that could be invoked by study statisticians whenever
the predetermined statistical threshold was reached. Instead, DSMBsmustmake difficult
judgment calls when interim analyses showworrisome trends that have not yet—or have
just barely—reached statistical significance.43
The information feeding into any DSMB decision to recommend trial continuation
past the point of a pre-specified stopping boundary will not be available to a reviewing
IRB or the FDA, nor will these bodies necessarily be told that the data has reached any
such a point. Accordingly there is very limited potential for contemporaneous decision-
making oversight.44 This raises the question of what other oversightmechanismsmight
be available, including post hoc review by courts of law.
3 LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ATTACHING TO EMERGING TRIAL
INFORMATION
Part two demonstrated the tight confidentiality with which emerging trial information
is held; in particular, byDSMBs. Often, this includes a siloing of information from clin-
ical trial actors until an emerging trend can satisfy highly stringent tests for statistical
certainty (and, perhaps, even beyond this point). Part three will canvass the key le-
gal obligations that might compel clinical trial actors to disclose or otherwise act upon
emerging trial information, including any potential for these obligations to conflictwith
common DSMB confidentiality practices. At least theoretically, actions could include
allegations of lack of informed consent, negligent conduct, product liability, fraud, and
breach of contract. For trials sponsored by publicly listed companies, non-disclosure
might constitute securities fraud.
39 Sydes et al., supra note 33; Wheatley and Clayton, supra note 28.
40 Redmond, Constantino, and Colton, supra note 3.
41 For example, N. Jewel Samadder et al., Effect of Sulindac and Erlotinib vs Placebo on Duodenal Neoplasia in
Familial Adenomatous Polyposis: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 315 JAMA 1266, 1275 (2016); Bhakti K. Patel
et al.,Effect ofNoninvasive VentilationDelivered byHelmet vs FaceMask on the Rate of Endotracheal Intubation in
PatientsWithAcuteRespiratoryDistress Syndrome:ARandomizedClinical Trial, 315 JAMA2435, 2441 (2016).
42 This was the rationale, for example, in Patel et al., supra note 41.
43 JohnD. Lantos &Chris Feudtner, SUPPORT and the Ethics of Study Implementation: Lessons for Comparative
Effectiveness Research from the Trial of Oxygen Therapy for Premature Babies, 45 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 30, 40
(2015).
44 Eckstein, supra note 13.
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3.1 Lack of InformedConsent
Obligations in US tort law to obtain the informed consent of a patient or clinical trial
participant are well established, with the typical legal action alleging that a person was
not given adequate information to allow him or her to meaningfully decide whether
to participate in a clinical trial.45 In Lenahan v Univ. of Chicago, for example, a partici-
pant in a clinical cancer trial successfully pleaded that the defendants (the University,
University Hospital, and trial researchers) had a duty to provide himwith an ‘adequate
informed consent’.46 This was equated with a consent compliant with FDA andDHHS
rules and regulations—in particular, a consent form that specified ‘all the risks and al-
ternatives to treatment’.47
Implicit within consent requirements may be an obligation to seek reconsent from
trial participants in certain circumstances, including on the basis of emerging trial in-
formation. An articulation of this duty was given in the case of Mink v University of
Chicago, brought forward by 1,000 women who had been administered diethylstillbe-
strol in their prenatal care without their knowledge or consent as a part of a clinical
trial.48 The plaintiffs claimed that DES exposure had led to an increased risk of cancer
for themselves and their children: a relationship that was known to the medical com-
munity by 1971 but was not notified to participants until as late as 1975 or 1976. Al-
though the action was unsuccessful based on an absence of attributable injury, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed that the defendants had an
ongoing duty to notify participants of emerging risks, including risks that came to light
after treatment had concluded.49
More recently, the Court of Appeals ofMaryland emphasized the ongoing nature of
informed consent obligations in Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute.50 This lawsuit was
brought forward by two children who had been recruited into a lead abatement study.
Among other actions, they alleged a lack of informed consent because the research in-
stitute had failed to warn participants in a timely manner of unsafe blood lead levels.
The Grimes court agreed that the requirement of informed consent ‘continues during
the duration of the research study and applies to new or changing risks’.51
Notably, the FDA andDHHS rules and regulations specify the need for clinical trial
consent forms to include a statement, ‘when appropriate,’ that participants will be pro-
vided with ‘significant new findings developed during the course of the research which
may relate to the subject’s willingness to continue participation’.52 Statements to this
effect have been adopted in a number of template patient information sheets and con-
sent forms (PISCFs). As an example, the National Cancer Institute Informed Consent
Template for Adult Clinical Trials includes the heading ‘If I Decide to Take Part Can I
Stop Later?’ In part, this states, ‘Your study doctor will tell you about new information
or changes in the study thatmay affect your health or yourwillingness to continue in the
45 Mello, Studdert, and Brennan, supra note 7.
46 Lenahan v. Univ. of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 155, 160, (2004).
47 Id.
48 Mink v. University of Chicago 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
49 Id.
50 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366Md. 29, 98, (2001).
51 Id.
52 45 CFR 46.116 (b)(5) and 21 CFR 50.25 (b)(5).
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study’.53 The Stanford University Sample Consent Form includes a similar statement
under the heading ‘Participant Rights’,54 advising participants that ‘You will be told of
any important new information that is learned during the course of this research study,
which might affect your condition or your willingness to continue participation in this
study’.
The inclusion of a commitment to alert trial participants to ‘significant new findings’
in PISCFs also might constitute a stand-alone contractual obligation. In a few cases,
courts have been willing to characterize PISCFs as a ‘unilateral contract’ between a re-
searcher or a research institution and a participant.55 AsMello and Joffe explain, in this
kindof contract ‘a promise (by the investigators and institution) is exchanged for a ‘per-
formance’ (the subject’s participation in a trial)’. They go on to note that ‘this kind of
contract does not bind the subjects to go through with the performance, but if they do,
the promisor must fulfill the promise’.56
3.2 Negligent Conduct
A failure to disclose or otherwise act upon emerging trial information also might form
the foundation of a broader action in negligent trial conduct.That is, that a clinical trial
actor has failed to ‘carry out their defined obligations and duties with due care for par-
ticipant safety’.57
An action in negligent conduct is likely to be successful where a clinical trial actor
has clear knowledge of an investigational product’s lack of safety or efficacy. Analogous
in this regard is E. Haavi Morreim’s explanation of the litigation arising from highly
experimental investigations conducted on glioblastoma patients at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts General Hospital. She recounts that,
according to the federal district court, Dr. Sweet, the principal investigator,
had actual knowledge of the imprecision of the localization of the boron injections to
the cancerous brain tissue and the related imprecision of the neutron radiation, with the
result that unacceptably high degrees of radiation necrosis were occurring in these and
other of his patients. In short, Sweet well knew during his care of these patients that his
[experimental] treatments were not helping them, and, in fact, were causing severe side
effects unrelated to the progressive effect of the fatal brain tumors. He pressed ahead any-
way, believing in complete good faith that such experimentation on dying patients held
out hope for other cancer victims. However praiseworthy his goal, his conduct with re-
spect to the patients involved here was, as the jury found, negligent.58
53 National Cancer Institute, INFORMED CONSENT TEMPLATE (2017), https://ctep.cancer.
gov/protocolDevelopment/informed consent.htm (accessed Oct 26, 2018).
54 StanfordUniversity IRB, SAMPLECONSENTFORM(2018), http://researchcompliance.stanford.edu/hs/new/
resources/forms templates/medical.html. (accessed Oct 26, 2018)
55 E.g., Abney v Amgen, 443 F.3d 540 (2006);Dahl v HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp, 7 F.3d 1399 (1993). In other
cases, PISCFs have not been accepted as a legal contract, e.g., Smith v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., No. 2241,
Sept Term 2014, 2017WL 1076481 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 22, 2017).
56 MichelleM.Mello & Steven Joffe,Compact versus Contract— Industry Sponsors’ Obligations toTheir Research
Subjects, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2737, 2743 (2007).
57 Zeman v. Williams, No. CIV.A. 11-10204-GAO, 2014WL 3058298 at ∗3 (D. Mass. July 7, 2014).
58 E. Haavi Morreim,Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4
HOUST. J. HEALTH LAWPOLICY 1, 40 (2003), citingHeinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F. Supp. 2d 73, 90,
91 (D. Mass. 2000).
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However, as explained in part two, modern clinical trial practices mean that un-
blinded safety and efficacy information most commonly is siloed within the confines
of a DSMB. Accordingly, an action in negligence based on a failure to use or otherwise
disclose clinical trial data would likely take the form of one of the following:
1. An action against a trial DSMB for failure to undertake its monitoring obligations
with due care for participant well-being. Concerns about the potential for litiga-
tion to be brought directly against a DSMB or its members have been raised
in the literature,59 but has yet to be tested in a court in the US or elsewhere.
However, scope for an action in negligent monitoring appear especially acute
where a stopping boundary has been reached but a DSMBmakes a decision to
continue the trial—for example, to establish additional information about po-
tential adverse effects or secondary efficacy endpoints. This assumes, however,
that a potentially harmed participant knows about the DSMB decision and is
able to overcome associated causation issues.60
2. An action against a trial sponsor or another clinical trial actor for failing to establish
a safe study design. Litigation could also focus on the monitoring processes and
practices as articulated in the trial protocol and any available DSMB charter.
This could stem from a duty on actors to ‘monitor the progress of their studies
to ensure compliance with study protocols and the health and safety of partici-
pants’ in order to ‘protect participants generally from foreseeable harm caused
by the drug studies themselves’, as articulated by the California SecondDistrict
Court ofAppeal in the unpublished case ofLiu v JanssenResearch&Dev., LLC.61
Thecase involved an action innegligence for the deathof 17-year-oldAugustine
Liu. Despite early indications of a cardiac condition, Augustine was enrolled in
a trial assessing the use of a new drug, risperidone, for schizophrenia. After re-
ceiving his first dose, Augustine developed cardiomyopathy, pneumonia, and
failing liver function. He died four days later.The Court of Appeals overturned
the jury’s finding of negligence on the basis that the sponsor’s duty did not ex-
tend to an obligation to diagnose or treat Augustine’s pre-existing disease or to
intervene in his subsequent medical care.62 At least theoretically, however, the
duty formulation proposed by the Court of Appeals could support an obliga-
tion for a trial sponsor or another clinical trial actor to suspend or terminate a
trial for emerging safety or efficacy signals.
3.3 Other Tort Actions
Persons harmed by an alleged failure to monitor the safety or efficacy of a clinical trial
alsomay seek tobring actions inother torts,mostnotably, product liability or fraud.Un-
der product liability tort, a manufacturer—commonly the clinical trial sponsor—has
obligations to warn of dangers in its products of which it knows, or which are
59 David L. DeMets et al.,Liability issues for datamonitoring committee members, 1 CLIN.TRIALS 525, 531 (2004).
60 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Pike,Recovering fromResearch: ANo-Fault Proposal to Compensate Injured Research Par-
ticipants, 38 AM. J. LAWMED. 7, 62, 28 (2012).
61 Liu v. Janssen Research&Dev., LLC,No. B269318, 2018WL272219, at∗6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2018), review
denied (Apr. 11, 2018), cert. denied, No. 18-97, 2018WL 3536949 (USOct. 1, 2018).
62 Id.
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reasonably foreseeable.63 The extent towhich ‘reasonable foreseeability’ of dangers in a
clinical trial product fits with stringent DSMB confidentiality conditions for unblinded
trial data is unclear.
A failure towarnof interim trial datapotentially could also support an action in fraud,
as was alleged in the case of Gelsinger v University of Pennsylvania Hospital, stemming
from the death of an 18-year old in a phase 1 gene therapy trial.64 TheGelsinger family
alleged that the researchers’ failure to reveal the death of monkeys injected with the
virus and the serious adverse effects suffered by previous trial participants constituted
fraud.65 The case was settled confidentially.66
3.4 Securities Fraud
Publicly listed pharmaceutical companies have duties of disclosure to their sharehold-
ers, including, in some instances, of emerging clinical trial data.TheU.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission requires publicly-listed companies to submit periodic updates,
including, a statement of ‘management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition
and results of operations’. Among other matters, this should include information on
‘any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably ex-
pects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or
income from continuing operations’.67
Under Rule 10(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, it is unlawful to ‘make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading’. Courts have implied a private cause of action into this rule. To
succeed, a plaintiff must demonstrate all the following: ‘(1) a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter (explained below); (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4)
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss cau-
sation’.68
This raises the question of what constitutes a ‘material misrepresentation or omis-
sion’ for the purpose of Rule 10(b).Through the case of Basic v Levinson, the Supreme
Court has held that themateriality element is satisfiedwhen there is ‘a substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of informationmade available’.69
The Supreme Court has since clarified in the case of Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v Siracu-
sano, that materiality is not necessarily equivalent to statistical significance.70 Depend-
ing on their source, content, and context, adverse event reports may significantly al-
ter the total mix of information available to investors, despite not reaching the level of
63 Mulhall v. Hannafin, 45 A.D.3d 55, 58 (2007).
64 Gelsinger v. University of Pennsylvania Hospital (Pa. C., No. 001885, complaint filed Sept. 18, 2000)
65 Id.
66 Mello, Studdert, and Brennan, supra note 7.
67 17 CFR 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
68 JosephG.Milner, Sunlight and Other Disinfectants: Disclosure Obligations under the Federal Securities and Drug
Regulatory Regimes H.Thomas Austern Writing Competition Winners, 72 FOOD DRUG LAW J. 141, 188 (2017);
KatherineCohen, JosephW.Cormier&MahnuV.Davar,PredictableMateriality: ANeed forCommonCriteria
Governing theDisclosure of Clinical Trial Results by Publicity-Traded Pharmaceutical Companies, 29 J.CONTEMP.
HEALTH LAW POLICY 201, 232 (2012).
69 Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (2010).
70 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano 563 U.S. 27 (2012).
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statistical significance or known causation. Rather, the Court held that a fact-specific
inquiry was necessary to ascertain whether adverse events werematerial and needed to
be disclosed.71
Beyond materiality, a plaintiff will also need to show that company representatives
acted with scienter—the required state of mind. Any such action will depend on actual
knowledge or, potentially, deliberate recklessness. Moreover, while the Basic standard
imposes liability formaterial omissions, it exempts ‘pureomissions’. Inorder tobe liable
for an omission, the issuer must have a duty to disclose information.72 In the context of
interim clinical trial results, such a duty of disclosure may arise if the company makes
statements that—in the absence of information about the interim results—willmislead
investors.73
4 COURT ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGED DUTIES TO USE OR DISCLOSE
INTERIM TRIAL DATA
Evident in the legal analysis set out in part three is the scope for considerable discretion
in the manner in which a court might assess a legal claim stemming from an alleged
failure to disclose or otherwise act upon interim clinical trial data.This is especially the
case given the prima facie disconnect between accepted DSMB practices (i.e., confi-
dentiality until interim trial data can satisfy stringent causative thresholds) and much
broader legal disclosure obligations: for example, of information for which there is ‘rea-
sonable evidence’ of adverse effect, or that might have a ‘material’ impact on a sponsor
company’s revenues or impact.
The question for this paper was the manner in which US courts were assessing alle-
gations that clinical trial actors had a duty to use or disclose emerging trial information,
and how any such duties interacted with the siloing of information within independent
DSMBs.A comprehensive searchwas conducted forUS cases involving allegations that
a clinical trial actor was under an obligation to disclose interim clinical trial data. Two
large legal databases—Thomson Reuters Westlaw and LexisNexis International—were
interrogated in July 2018 for all federal and state US decisions using various combi-
nations of the following search terms: clinical trial, research, drug, investigation, study,
disclose, terminate, monitor, blind, Data and Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB), Data
MonitoringCommittee (DMC). Resultswere filteredmanually for cases inwhich anobli-
gation of disclosure of information relating to ongoing clinical trials ormedical research
was at issue. Excluded fromanalysiswere cases such asMcDarby vMerck&Co., Inc., 401
(the Vioxx product liability case)74 andN.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v Bio-
gen 537 F. 3d 35,75 in which plaintiffs alleged a duty to interpret, disclose, or otherwise
act upon data from finalized trials. The 21 cases that met these criteria are set out in
Table 1.
4.1 Cases Brought Forward byTrial Participants or Patients
Only four cases were identified inwhichUS courts adjudicated upon an action brought
forward by a patient or research participant alleging that a trial sponsor or researcher
71 For discussion, see Milner, supra note 69; Cohen, Cormier, and Davar, supra note 69.
72 Milner, supra note 69.
73 Cohen, Cormier, and Davar, supra note 70.
74 McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., 401 N.J. Super. 10, 28 (App.Div. May 29, 2008).
75 N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v Biogen 537 F. 3d 35 (U.S. App., 2008).
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was under a duty to disclose or otherwise act upon interim trial data. This likely re-
flects challenges that have been more broadly identified for research participants face
in mounting successful tort actions.76 However, the available cases show a clear will-
ingness to accept FDA review of trial methodology and the blinding process. In par-
ticular, the cases evidence a judicial unwillingness to unblind, or to require unblinding,
when there is evidence of an operational (though not necessarily detailed) monitoring
process.
The strongest support for a duty on researchers and others to provide participants
with information obtained during the course of research comes from the case ofGrimes
v Kennedy Krieger Institute.77 This case surrounded a research study investigating lead
abatement procedures, specificallymore cost-effective partial abatement. Effectiveness
was to be determined by levels of lead dust in the home, as well as blood lead levels of
child participants living in the selected homes. Plaintiffs brought forward an action in
negligence arguing that researchers had a duty to inform them more clearly of the fact
that some lead dust was expected to accumulate in their children despite the ablation
procedures that had been conducted, and to promptly advise them of individual lead
test results.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that researchers entered into a ‘special rela-
tionship’ with child participants, which included a duty to—at aminimum—promptly
provide them and their parents with ‘any information that might bear on their willing-
ness to continue to participate in the study’ including ‘full, detailed, prompt, and con-
tinuing warnings as to all the potential risks and hazards inherent in the research or
that arise during the research’.78 The Court put forward a strong role for the judiciary
in overseeing the medical and scientific community, including the decisions of review-
ing IRBs, opining that ‘IRBs, are, primarily, in-house organs’ which are ‘not designed,
generally, to be sufficiently objective in the sense that they are as sufficiently concerned
with the ethicality of the experiments they review as they are with the success of the
experiments’.79 In noting the limits of participant consent in defining the scope of re-
searcher duties, the Court stated:
The duty to a vulnerable research subject is independent of consent, although the obtain-
ing of consent is one of the duties a researcher must perform. . . . Such legal duties, and
legal protections, might additionally be warranted because of the likely conflict of inter-
est between the goal of the research experimenter and the health of the human subject,
especially, but not exclusively, when such research is commercialized. There is always a
potential substantial conflict of interest on the part of researchers as between them and
the human subjects used in their research. If participants in the study withdraw from the
research study prior to its completion, then the results of the study could be rendered
meaningless. There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying information to subjects
as it arises, that might cause the subjects to leave the research project. That conflict dic-
tates a stronger reason for full and continuous disclosure.80
76 Pike, supra note 60.
77 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute, 366Md. 29, (2001).
78 Id at 843.
79 Id at 817.
80 Id at 850–51. Emphasis added.
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The strong judicial oversight of research advocated by the Grimes Court was sub-
ject to immediate discussion and controversy,81 and, following on from a motion for
reconsideration, the judgment’s precedentwas limited only to the conclusion that sum-
mary judgmentwas improperly granted.82The lack of weight that theGrimes precedent
may have for subsequent courts, and a marked shift towards judicial deference for the
scientific process, was evident in the subsequent case ofWhite v Kennedy Krieger Insti-
tute.83 This case arose from a related lead abatement study conducted by KKI in the
1990s. The Treatment of Lead–Exposed Children Study (‘TLC Study’) was designed
to study methods to lower lead poisoning in inner cities, through some environmen-
tal modifications and nutritional supplements, as well as a double-blinded component
investigating the effects of the drug succimer—which had already been approved for
use in children with extremely elevated lead blood levels—in children with moderate
lead exposure. As a part of this investigation, blood levels were taken from study partic-
ipants two weeks after each round of treatment. Test results were reported to the Data
Coordinating Center, which would notify KKI if a child’s blood lead level exceeded
pre-specified thresholds.84 The plaintiff, Tyron White, brought an action against KKI
alleging that, due to the Institute’s negligent conduct in this study he was exposed to
harmful levels of lead resulting in irreparable brain injuries.
At trial, a jury deliberatedonwhetherKKIwasnegligent in planning and implement-
ing the TLC study, including whether it had breached a duty to participants. The jury
ultimately decided that it had not. In his jury instruction, the trial judge described the
researchers’ duty as being to use reasonable care to ensure ‘the protection of the study
participants fromunreasonable harm’ including ‘completely and promptly inform[ing]
the participants of potential hazards existing during the study’. The plaintiffs appealed
this instruction as failing to capture the full extent of researcher duties, as set out in
Grimes, being to provide ‘full, detailed, prompt, and continuing warnings as to all the
potential risks and hazards inherent in the research or that arise during the research’.
This more extensive duty formulation was rejected on appeal. For theMaryland Court
of Special Appeals, the double-blinded nature of the study was particularly pertinent in
limiting any ‘special duties’ that might be imposed on researchers, including any duty
to warn about a child’s elevated blood lead levels:
Even if White’s proposed instruction . . . properly reflected the holding of the Grimes
Court (that a special relationship may be created by the researcher’s special knowledge
that in turn gives rise to a duty to warn), it would still fail on the facts of the TLC
81 For example, LeonardH.Glantz,Nontherapeutic Research with Children: Grimes v KennedyKrieger Institute, 92
AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1070–1073 (2002); Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations under Legal
Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows Their Interpretation, 30 J. LAW. MED. ETHICS 38–49 (2002); Diane E. Hoffmann &
Karen H. Rothenberg,Whose Duty Is It Anyway: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public
Health Research Symposium: Research with Children:TheNew Legal and Policy Landscape:The Kennedy Krieger
Case, 6 J. HEALTH CARE LAW POLICY 109, 147 (2002).
82 Discussed inWhite v. Kennedy Krieger Institute 221Md.App. 601 (Md. Feb. 26, 2015).
83 Id.
84 If a child’s blood lead level was 45mcg/dL or higher, KKIwas to retest within three days. If the level remained
45mcg/dL or higher after retesting, participation in the study treatment would pause, and the child would be
treated in accordance with normal protocol for children with moderate blood lead levels. If the child’s blood
lead level measured above 60 mcg/dL, participation in the study would end immediately and the child be
treated according to normal treatment protocols for children with extreme blood lead levels.
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Study. In Grimes, the special knowledge that the researchers had—but that the parents
lacked—was knowledge of the child subjects’ elevated blood lead levels. Here, however,
the TLC Study was double blind, and pursuant to the TLC Study Protocol, KKI was not
notified of the results of an individual child’s blood lead levels unless the child’s blood
lead level went above 44mcg/dL. At any point that a child’s lead levels were confirmed to
be higher than 44 mcg/dL during the TLC Study, KKI was required to notify the parent,
end the child’s participation in the TLC Study, and begin treating the child according to
KKI’s standard procedure for treating children with blood lead levels above 44 mcg/dL.
Prior to a child’s blood lead level reaching above 44mcg/dL, KKIwas not notified of fluc-
tuations in blood lead levels, and therefore could not pass along that information to the
parents.Thus, the TLC Study Protocol by design prevented KKI from having the specific
knowledge of a child’s elevated lead levels that inGrimeswere found to, at times, give rise
to special duties.85
In one of the few other cases in which a US court has adjudicated on an alleged duty
to use and disclose interim trial data, the court dismissed any such duty based on FDA
pre-emption through the Medical Devices Act of 1976 (MDA), thereby excluding the
application of state tort laws.The unreported judgment ofParks vHowmedicaOsteonics
Corp. involved a range of actions in tort stemming from a clinical trial of CerviCore In-
tervertebral Disc (‘CerviCore’).86 The sponsor companyHowmedicaOsteonics Corp.
(HOC) developed CerviCore as an alternative to anterior discectomy and fusion pro-
cedures. HOC obtained an FDA Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) under the
MDA to initiate a randomized clinical trial of the unit. According to the plaintiff com-
plaint, considerable adverse eventsmaterialized during the course of the trial, including
evidenceof device failure and the release ofmetal debris into participants’ bodies.HOC
ultimately terminated device development and the CerviCore trial. The plaintiff—a
trial participant who was randomized to receive the CerviCore unit—brought forward
a range of actions (defective product design and manufacture, failure to warn, negli-
gence and gross negligence, and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation) against
HOC grounded in a failure to protect trial participants from dangers of which it should
have been aware.TheUnited States District Court Middle District of Florida held that
the FDA’s granting of an IDE pre-empted any such causes of action,87 given that a fact-
finder could find liability even if a manufacturer had complied with all relevant FDA
regulations. This was consistent with other cases in which courts have assessed the ap-
plication of state tort laws such as product liability and failure to warn in the context of
devices for which a sponsor has obtained an IDE.88
A quite different actionwas brought forward by Sara Kinkaid, a plaintiff in a class ac-
tion against the manufacturer of Actos (pioglitazone) alleging a lack of warning about
85 Id at 740.
86 Parks v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp, No. 8:15-cv-75, 2015WL 3581714 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 27, 2015).
87 This was based upon the provision in the Medical Device Act of 1976 stating that, ‘no State or political sub-
division of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement—(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter
to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included
in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter’.
88 For example,Blinn v. Smith&Nephew Richards, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Fowler et al.
v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 97–1380–CIV–J–10B, 1999WL 1132967 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1999);
Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992); Dorsey v. Allergan, Inc., No. 3:08–0731,
2009WL 703290 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2009).
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the link between Actos and bladder cancer. In the case of Kinkaid v Inzucchi, Ms Kin-
caid sought data from an ongoing clinical trial being conducted by the Yale School of
Medicine assessing whether pioglitazone is effective in lowering the risk of stroke or
myocardial infarction among non-diabetic persons who have suffered recent ischemic
strokeor transient ischemic attack andwho are insulin resistant (‘the IRIS study’).89 Ms
Kinkaid sought to compel information on the incidence of bladder cancer in IRIS study
participants, including unblinding of the treatment group for the eleven study partici-
pants at that time diagnosed with bladder cancer.TheConnecticut Superior Court de-
nied the request based on the need to maintain the integrity of the IRIS trial: ‘While
the court recognizes that the discovery of the sought information may potentially be
useful to the plaintiff if statistically significant, the risk of jeopardizing the integrity of
the study outweighs the potential benefit to the plaintiff’.90 It further noted that
the DSMB, which is responsible for assuring the scientific conduct and the safety of the
study, has reviewed the treatment arm date biannually, has reviewed the actual treatment
assignments since 2011 and has not indicated in any of its reports that it has concerns
regarding the nexus between pioglitazone and bladder cancer.91
Although the IRIS study protocol provided the DSMB with significant leeway in
terms of adverse event monitoring, themonitoring process for the study was not raised
in party filings or the judgment. Under the heading ‘Analysis of Adverse Events’, the
protocol specified that ‘The incidence of serious adverse events . . . and any adverse
events . . . will be calculated and compared among the treatment groups using statistics
appropriate for discrete or count data. Time to adverse events will also be monitored
and compared between treatment arms’.92 The only additional guidance comes under
the heading ‘Responsibilities’ and tasks the DSMBwith ‘monitor[ing] interim data re-
garding the safety and efficacy of the study regimen so that the trial will be concluded
as soon as there is convincing evidence of the treatment effect’ and ‘advis[ing] the [trial
sponsor] and the investigators as to whether a protocol should continue as scheduled
or undergo modification due to a finding from the monitoring process’.93 This is in no
way intended to criticize the protocol, especially given the challenge of meaningfully
specifying stopping criteria for safety in the absence of prior knowledge of likely ad-
verse events and rates. Yet the result is considerable DSMB discretion in determining
the threshold at which to advise sponsors and investigators of any emerging concerns:
a discretion that warrants (at a minimum) recognition when it comes to the weight the
judiciary and others place on DSMB reviews.
89 No NNHCV126035005S, 2013WL 5496537 (Conn. Super. Ct., Sept. 16, 2013).
90 Kinkaid v. Inzucchi, No NNHCV126035005S, 2013WL 5496537 (Conn. Super. Ct., Sept. 16, 2013) at ∗4.
91 Id.
92 Walter N. Kernan et al., Pioglitazone after Ischemic Stroke or Transient Ischemic Attack, 374 N. ENGL. J. MED.
1321, 1331 (2016), supplementarymaterials.Notably, the pivotal trial publication advised that Incident blad-
der cancer occurred in 12 patients in the pioglitazone group and in 8 in the placebo group (P = 0.37). The
total incidence of cancer did not differ significantly between the two groups (133 patients and 150 patients,
respectively; P= 0.29): Id.
93 Kernan et al., supra note 92, supplementary materials.
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4.2 Cases Brought Forward by SponsorCompany Shareholders
A total 17 caseswere identified inwhich shareholders of a sponsor company brought an
action alleging securities fraud based on the non-disclosure of interim trial information.
Once again, theprevailing trendwas clear judicial acceptanceof arguments grounded in
scientific methodology and the availability of oversight through specialized regulators
such as the FDA.
4.2.1 Allegations of Non-DisclosureThrough Study Design
Only one case expressly dealt with trial design and stopping rules as a tool available to
sponsor companies to limit their knowledge of interim trial data and, accordingly, their
disclosure obligations. In Re Pfizer, Inc. Securities Litigation stemmed from clinical trials
of a drug torcetrapib, which Pfizer was developing as a potential treatment for coronary
heart disease.94 Phase 3 trials of the drug were terminated after a DSMB recommenda-
tion citing an imbalance of mortality and cardiovascular events. Shareholders argued
that Pfizer had acted misleadingly by failing to disclose facts that lessened the likeli-
hood that torcetrapib would prove safe and effective. Most relevantly, that Pfizer had
‘designed the phase 3 trials to allow the trial to continue until an unreasonably high
standard of statistical certainty wasmet’.95 TheAmendedClass ActionComplaint sub-
stantiated this claim, advising that the trial stopping rule was set at a level of P< 0.01,
arguing that:
While such a degree of certaintymight have application where a patient population is ter-
minally ill—and therefore the risk of death from continuation of the trial is lessened—it
clearly had no application here where the patient population was generally healthy. Us-
ing a 95 per cent certainty level that adverse results were caused by torcetrapib would
have had no negative impact on the study other than to end it earlier and potentially save
lives.96
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
Pfizer’s motion to dismiss. To the extent that the Court engaged with the claimedmis-
behavior surrounding trial design, it accepted the stopping boundary as ‘an appropriate
measure of statistical significance’.97 Moreover, it noted that—without more—a ‘con-
clusory allegation’ based on trial design is insufficient evidence of a defendant’s fraud-
ulent intent.
Plaintiffs in the case of Lerner v Northwest Biotherapeutics also sought to draw links
between alleged deficiencies in oversight processes and non-fulfillment of sponsor dis-
closure obligations.98 At issue in this case were sponsor press releases citing ‘encour-
aging results’ from an ongoing phase 3 trial of a cancer immunotherapy, DCVax-L. On
Aug. 21, 2015, the FDA issued a clinical hold on trial recruitment, leading to a 22 per
cent drop in share prices.
94 In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 621, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
95 Id.
96 AmendedClass ActionComplaint, 94-98, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-14199-LAK (S.D.N.Y., Apr.
2, 2007).
97 In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 621, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
98 Lerner v Northwest Biotherapeutics 273 F.Supp.3d 573 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2017).
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One of the statements with which plaintiffs took issue was a sponsor company press
release issued on Mar. 7, 2014 stating that the DSMB had made an ‘unblinded review
of the safety data . . . and recommended that the trial continue as planned.TheDSMB’s
review of the efficacy data is still pending’. Plaintiffs alleged that the interim review had
actually commenced in 2013 and would only have taken a few weeks to complete and,
accordingly, the review ‘was either completed and buried, or the DSMB had been di-
rected not to complete it’.99 The United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land dismissed the action. Based on the available facts, JusticeHazel did not accept that
an efficacy review had, in fact, been conducted. He further emphasized the separation
betweenDSMB processes and the sponsor company, stating that ‘it is unclear from the
Complaint how Plaintiffs attribute the alleged shortcomings of the safety board review
to Defendants given their stated lack of involvement’.100
4.2.2 Inferences Regarding Sponsor Knowledge About Relative Safety or Efficacy of Trial
Interventions
Other cases have sought to base sponsor company disclosure obligations on inferences
about what information the company know, or should have known, about the respec-
tive merits of trial interventions.
(a) UnblindedData. For unblinded trials, the availability of information to the spon-
sor company is relatively straightforward, with the criteria for disclosure therefore de-
pending on judicial determinations of themateriality of the information and any scien-
ter in sponsor decision-making. In re Alliance Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities Litigation
provides one of the few examples in which a court has upheld the sufficiency of plaintiff
shareholder pleadings with respect to duties to disclose emerging trial information.101
One of the issues in this trial was the disclosures necessary to shareholders of MBI—a
company with which the defendant company Alliance was merging. Shareholders of
MBI voted to approve the merger on Dec. 29, 2000. A prospectus had been issued in
connectionwith themerger onNov. 9, 2000, with updates onNov. 22 and 29, 2000. At
the time the merger was on foot, information was emerging about Oxygent, Alliance’s
‘premiere’ investigation product: an oxygen carrier being developed to reduce the need
for blood transfusions during surgery. Most importantly, an ongoing phase 3 trial had
begun to show an imbalance of stroke events between the investigational and control
arm.OnDec. 19 and 20, 2000 this imbalance became statistically significant, a fact that
was known to sponsor company personnel. Based on this imbalance, the sponsor com-
pany amended the trial inclusion criteria to exclude persons who appeared to be at a
higher risk of stroke. Trial investigators were informed of these amended criteria on
Dec. 22, 2000. Further adverse event information was received in early January, lead-
ing to suspension of the trial on January 8, 2001 and an associated press release. Plain-
tiffs argued that Alliance was under a duty to amend its registration statement to reflect
this imbalance in adverse events prior to the time it became effective (Dec. 29, 2000 or
possibly several days later at the time the merger was finalized).
While the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York em-
phasized that there was no duty on sponsor companies to provide ‘status updates’ on
99 Id at 57.
100 Id.
101 In re Alliance Pharmaceutical Corp. Securities Litigation 279 F.Supp.2d 171 (S.D.N.Y., 2003).
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clinical trial activities, it accepted that clinical trial developments adverse enough to
cause changes in the trial protocol had at least the potential to satisfy disclosure require-
ments. In upholding the adequacy of the pleadings in this regard, Justice McMahon
adopted a cautionary tone:
Plaintiffs will have their day in court, but they obviously face a much greater burden in
convincing a trier of fact of defendants’ liability than theyhaveovercomeherebydefeating
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs must show that, under the totality
of the circumstances, defendants were aware, as of the materiality date, that the increase
in adverse events cast doubt on the previous positive results of Oxygent.102
Similar caution in interpreting and enforcing disclosure requirementswas evident in
In Re Human Genome Sciences Inc Securities Litigation, in which the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland was unwilling to infer scienter from a sponsor
company’s non-disclosure of attempted and actual suicides in an ongoing, unblinded
extension study. Justice Titus noted that, ‘While it is possible to infer that HGS exec-
utives deliberately omitted facts about the attempted and actual suicides in order to
hoodwink investors, it is just as plausible, indeed more so, to infer that they only of-
fered vague details about the study because it was ongoing’.103
Other judgments that have sought to assess disclosure obligations attaching to
emerging trial information have used FDA actions as a marker for the materiality of
the information. In Sanders v Aveo Pharm., Inc., for example, evidence began to emerge
during unblinded phase 3 trials of an investigational kidney cancer drug of higher death
rates in the intervention as compared with the control arm.104 The FDA held ameeting
with the sponsor in which it raised concerns about the adverse overall survival trend.
Although the overall survival data were not ‘fully mature’, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed that the sponsor’s failure to disclose ‘an
unmistakeable and worsening trend’—in particular, one that had been the subject of
FDA warnings—was materially misleading.
This can be comparedwith In re Ariad Pharm. Inc, in which theCourt did not accept
that likely sponsor knowledge of an ‘increasing rate and pattern’ of adverse events in tri-
als for ponatinib, an investigational chronicmyeloid leukemia drug required disclosure
in stock offering materials.105 This was based on the fact that only six months’ worth of
trial data would be covered in the disputed period. Influential for the court in assessing
the materiality of the information was an FDA requirement from the preceding year
for data to be resubmitted after an additional 12months.TheCourt reasoned from this
that data from a six-month period—as compared with a 12-month period—was too
preliminary from which to draw sound conclusions.106 Similar caution was evident in
102 Id.
103 In Re Human Genome Sciences Inc Securities Litigation 933 F.Supp. 2d 751 (D. Md. Mar 22, 2012).
104 Sanders v. Aveo Pharm., Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-11157-DJC, 2015WL 1276824 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2015).
105 In re Ariad Pharm. Inc 98 F.Supp. 3d 147 (D. Mass. 2015).
106 An appeal of this finding was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, based on insufficient evi-
dence that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirement of having purchased shares thatwere the direct subject of the
prospectus and registration statement: In re Ariad Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 842 F.3d 744 (1st Cir. 2016). The
Court of Appeal overturned one District Court grant of a motion to dismiss, being a failure of the sponsor
company to identify the high incidence of serious cardiovascular events in the trial after the FDA had raised
concerns about the events, and dismissed the sponsors proposed label to better reflect these events.
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In Re Elan Corp Securities Litigation, in which the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York failed to uphold the materiality of non-disclosures of
emerging safety events in phase 3 clinical trials based on a lack of evidence of a statisti-
cally significant relationship with the product.107
(b) Blinded Information. In a number of trials involving blinded safety and efficacy
data, courts were asked to make inferences about sponsor knowledge of emerging
trends.These were rejected unanimously.
The facts of Nguyen v NewLink Genetics Corp., for example, were presented briefly
in the introduction to this paper.108 It involved a securities fraud action that share-
holders brought against a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company. The action al-
leged that the company fraudulently failed to disclose emerging information from a
phase 3 trial showing lack of efficacy of the company’s most progressed treatment
candidate—the HyperAcute Pancreas. The trial protocol allowed for four DSMB re-
views after pre-specified numbers of participant deaths. If the overall survival of partici-
pants in the treatment group exceeded that of control arm participants by pre-specified
amounts, the DSMB could recommend trial termination. Otherwise, the study was
to continue. The trial continued for its full duration. On completion, NewLink re-
ported that the treatment arm of the study had a lower overall survival than the con-
trol arm (27.3 months and 30.4 months respectively). NewLink share prices dropped
precipitously.
The question for the Court was whether NewLink acted fraudulently in press re-
leases while the trial was ongoing, including making a statement after the first interim
review that ‘it is reassuring that no unexpected safety issues or other concerns were
raised by the independent data safety monitoring committee’. The Court held that it
had not. A key consideration was the lack of sponsor knowledge of accruing survival
rates:
Importantly, NewLink and its officers and directors were blinded to the results of the clini-
cal trial. At each clinical trial milestone, an independent monitoring committee analyzed
data to determine whether the overall survival of trial participants receiving NewLink’s
immunotherapy exceeded that of a separate group of participants treated with standard
chemotherapy.109
Other judgments further stressed the separation between DSMB oversight and re-
view of blinded information and sponsor knowledge that could lead to duties of dis-
closure. In the case of Weinstein v Kirkman, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington assessed allegations of security fraud based on the
non-disclosure of emerging efficacy information of the investigational drug L-BLP25
from phase 3 clinical trials.110 The Court did not accept the fact that the DSMB had
conducted two interim efficacy reviews as allowing an inference that the sponsor com-
pany hadbeen informedof results. In allowing themotion to dismiss, theDistrictCourt
107 In Re Elan Corp Securities Litigation 543 F.Supp.2d 187 (S.D.N.Y.Mar. 27, 2008).This reasoning would likely
be inconsistent with the subsequent Supreme Court case ofMatrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct.
13098 (2011).
108 Nguyen v. New Link Genetics Corp. 297 F. Supp. 3d 472 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018)
109 Id at 478. Emphasis added.
110 Weinstein v. KirkmanNo. C13-0769-JCC, 2013WL 12121125 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 16, 2013).
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criticized any such inference as ‘not reasonable because it fundamentally misunder-
stands the purpose of an independent interim review of an ongoing clinical trial.’111
It went on to state that
TheCourt cannot reasonably infer that . . . trial datawasdisclosed to theboardbased solely
on the importance of L-BLP25 to [the sponsor’s] financial prospects because such a dis-
closure would defeat the purpose of an independent committee and potentially under-
mine the usefulness of the . . . trial in obtaining regulatory approval to market L-BLP25.
Notably, the trial at issue in this litigation—the Cancer Vaccine Study for Unre-
sectable Stage III Non-small Cell Lung Cancer (START) trial—adopted one of the
most rigorous stopping boundaries for interim analyses, being the O’Brien Fleming
group sequential design.112 Under this approach, the stopping boundaries for the two
interim analyses would be P< 0.006 and P< 0.0151 for the first and second analysis
respectively. While this gives weight to the argument that information was kept siloed
from sponsor company representatives, it raises other questions about study design,
including decisions about thresholds for disclosure.
A similar judicial focus on the siloed nature of trial information arose with respect
to allegations of non-disclosure of safety events in the case of Fortunato v AkebiaThera-
peutics, Inc.113 At issue was an alleged sponsor violation of the Securities Act of 1933 by
issuing a registration statement that failed to disclose information about adverse events
occurring in phase 2b clinical trials.Theplaintiffs argued thatAkebia as the trial sponsor
should have been aware of SAEs in trial participants, including that a greater proportion
of safety eventswere occurring in treatment group as comparedwith control group par-
ticipants.114 The Court accepted that trial sponsors had duties to assess safety events,
including, in certain circumstances, unblinding events to determine whether they met
the criteria for FDA reporting. However, in the absence of clear and particularized ev-
idence of unblinding, the Court was unwilling to infer sponsor company knowledge of
differences in safety events between trial arms.115 The United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts also declined to infer that a sponsor company had access
to unblinded safety information in the case of inErste-Sparinvest Kapitalanlagegellschaft
MBH v SeresTherapeutics, noting:
Sponsors receive notice of SAEs that occur in their trials, . . . , but such notice does
not ‘unblind’ the patient, by revealing whether they were in the SER-109 or placebo
groups, to report these SAEs to the FDA unless, in relevant part, the event relates to an
endpoint of the study . . . and there is a ‘causal relationship between the drug and the
111 Id at 3.
112 Charles Butts et al., Tecemotide (L-BLP25) versus placebo after chemoradiotherapy for stage III non-small-cell
lung cancer (START): a randomised, double-blind, phase 3 trial, 15 LANCET ONCOL. 59, 68 (2014).
113 Fortunato v. AkebiaTherapeutics, Inc. 34Mass.L.Rptr. 78 (Mass. Super. Feb. 21, 2017).
114 According to the plaintiff complaint, 23.9 per cent of participants in the treatment group reported a SAE,
comparedwith 15.3 per cent in the control group. Renal-related SAEs occurred in 13 participants in the treat-
ment group as compared with 2 in the control group: First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial
Demand, Fortunato v. AkebiaTherapeutics, Inc.,No. SUCV20152665 (Mass. Super., Aug 15, 2016).
115 Id.
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event,’ Because none of the SAEs were found to be drug-related, even taking the alle-
gations in the amended complaint as true, the high number of SAEs did not have any
relationship to SER-109, and thus did not on its own diminish the probability of the
phase 2 study’s success. Accordingly, the SAEs do not create an inference that Defen-
dants’ statements were false or misleading, and here do not support a claim for securities
fraud.116
4.2.3 Particularised Information onWhen Unblinding Occurred
To the extent that sponsor companies have gained some level of information about in-
terim trial data, courts have required close particularization of when that information
has been gained in order to substantiate allegations of securities fraud. Illustrative is
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana decision in Val-
labhaneni v Endocyte, Inc.117 Plaintiffs asserted that the sponsor company knew about
the investigational drug’s lack of efficacy prior to the DSMB recommendation that the
trial terminate based on an interim futility analysis.The plaintiffs argued that new imag-
ing protocols, introduced more than one year before trial termination made it ‘readily
apparent’ that the drug was not demonstrably effective in treating ovarian cancer. In
dismissing the action, the Court emphasized the need for details about when and how
the sponsor company could have gained knowledge about the drug’s lack of efficacy. It
stated that, ‘Withoutmore detail, it is impossible to determine how [the sponsor] knew
that efficacy was not demonstrated at such an early stage of the phase 3 study given
the double-blinded nature of the study’.118 TheCourt further questioned why the FDA
would allow the study to continue if the study’s data and design were as flawed as the
plaintiffs’ asserted.
Specificity about the timing of access to interim trial informationwas equally impor-
tant in the case of In re Intrabiotics Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig.,which stemmed from the early
termination of trials involving a drug designed to reduce the risk of ventilator-assisted
pneumonia. Trial termination followed aDSMB recommendation based on higher lev-
els of morbidity and mortality in the investigational arm as compared with the control
arm of the trial.119 Plaintiffs alleged that sponsor press releases made two months be-
fore trial termination that claimed that in experiences to date there had been ‘no differ-
ences in adverse events between the active and placebo groups observed consistently
among the trials’ were materially false and misleading.120 The Court accepted the pos-
sibility that, at some point before the decision to terminate was announced, the spon-
sor and the DSMB may have had access to information suggesting the investigational
drug was unsafe. However, it was unable to determine any basis for determining when
such information might have been available. In the subsequent order granting the De-
fendants’motion to dismiss, theDistrict Judge dismissed the potential for review of un-
blinded case report forms tohaveprovided enough information to substantiate sponsor
116 Erste-Sparinvest Kapitalanlagegesellschaft MBH v. Seres Therapeutics, Inc., No. CV 16-11943, 2018 WL
1567614, 5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2018). Internal citations omitted.
117 Vallabhaneni v. Endocyte, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01048-TWP-MJD, 2016WL 51260 (S.D. Ind., Jan. 4, 2016).
118 Id at ∗10.
119 In re Intrabiotics Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 04-02675 JSW, 2006 WL 708594 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 23, 2006),
motion to dismiss second consolidated complaint granted on Aug. 1, 2006.
120 Id at ∗5.
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knowledge of the emerging adverse event profile, given that overall rates of adverse
events and mortality were less than what would have been expected.121
4.2.4 Incompleteness of Disclosed Information
Several cases disputed the accuracy of sponsor disclosures about interim trial data, in-
cluding an alleged obligation on sponsors to contextualize or interpret information for
shareholders. Courts disputed any such obligation. InCity of Bristol Pension Fund v Ver-
tex Pharm Inc., plaintiff shareholders alleged that a sponsor company statement had
misled themarket by touting interim efficacy results as being ‘highly statistically signifi-
cant, with a p of 0.002’.122 Plaintiff shareholders alleged that the defendant should have
known that the results were ‘too good to be true’.123 TheCourt noted that the informa-
tion the company presented was factually correct, given previous judgments in which
a P value of 0.05 or less was an accepted measure of statistical significance. Although
the company had used the information to paint an optimistic or positive picture, this
did not cross the line into misleading. Other judgments have concurred that sponsor
companies do not have a duty to ‘connect the dots’ for shareholders or spell out any
doubts that interim data may have raised.124
5 DISCUSSION
Clinical trial practices increasingly include the siloing of interim trial data into inde-
pendent DSMBs. This is an important development in balancing the need to keep the
study blind among sponsors, investigators, and others with ongoing monitoring of po-
tential efficacy and safety signals. However, the requisite standards for trial monitoring
are somewhat elusive. In particular, the point atwhich emerging trial information needs
to be disclosed to trial participants or otherwise acted upon remains unclear.This is fur-
ther complicated by the wide spectrum of pre-specified stopping boundaries incorpo-
rated into clinical trial protocols—including some set at a level of ‘proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt’—and DSMB discretion in acting upon these pre-specified boundaries.
Courts of lawprovide one avenue for oversight of trial disclosure practices. Potential
legal obligations include duties on sponsors and investigators to obtain andmaintain an
adequate informed consent from trial participants, negligent trial conduct that might
stem from a failure to use or disclose emerging trial information, and other actions in
tort grounded in obligations to warn of potential dangers, such as fraud and product
liability. Publicly listed sponsor companies also have duties to disclose information that
might have amaterial impact on their sales or revenue to shareholders.Thequestion for
this paper was the manner in which U.S. courts were assessing allegations that clinical
trial actors had a duty to use or disclose emerging trial information, and how any such
duties interacted with the siloing of information within independent DSMBs.
121 In re Intrabiotics Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig.No. C 04-02675 JSW. Aug. 1, 2006.
122 City of Bristol Pension Fund v Vertex Pharm Inc. 12 F.Supp.3d 225 (Mar. 31, 2014).
123 Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 54, City of Bristol Pension Fund v Vertex
Pharm Inc., No. 1:12-cv-11654-FDS (D. Mass, Feb. 11, 2013).
124 Huang v Avalanche Biotechnologies, Inc, No. 15-cv-03185-JD, 2016WL 6524401 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016);
Shah v GenVec, Inc. No. DKC 12–0341., 2013 WL 5348133 (D. Md, Sept, 20, 2013); Sec. Police 7 Fire
Professionals of Am. Ret. Fund v Pfizer No. 10–cv–3105, 2013 WL 1750010 (D.N.J., Apr. 22, 2013) and
appeal in City of Edinburgh Council v Pfizer Inc, 754 F.3d 159.
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The cases present a marked picture of judicial willingness to accept the stated needs
of clinical trial practices, including those that might severely limit the availability of po-
tentially relevant information to participants, shareholders, and others.Three key con-
straints on legal oversight of the disclosure and use of interim trial data can be distilled.
(1) An uncritical acceptance of the blinding process. The available cases almost uni-
formly accept the need for the blinded nature of much emerging clinical trial
data without a deeper analysis of the role of clinical trial actors such as trial
sponsors in setting the parameters for the blind, for example, through crafting
the available stopping rules. The double-blinded study design was relied upon
in White v KKI125 to distinguish from the facts from the ‘special duties’ that
researchers were held to owe participants inGrimes v KKI to disclose of emerg-
ing information.126
Judicial acceptance of the blinded nature of trial information was the case even for
trial protocols that imposed highly stringent stopping rules, such as the START trial at
issue inWeinstein v Kirkman,127 and for those in which DSMBs had almost unlimited
discretion in interpreting criteria for unblinding such as the IRIS trial at issue in Kin-
caid v Inzucchi,128 the protocol for which allowed the DSMB to recommend unblind-
ing at such time as there was ‘convincing evidence of the treatment effect’.129 Similarly,
the lack of disclosure to shareholders of almost certain futility in the case of Nguyen
v New Link Genetics Company was argued and decided on the basis of lack of sponsor
knowledge.130 There was no judicial scrutiny over the sponsor role in designing the cir-
cumstances under which knowledge will be imparted; in this case, including the lack
of a futility analysis in the data monitoring plan—a fact that was noted in reports on
the failed trial131—or other provisions for alerting the sponsor of an ongoing negative
trend.
(1) Reliance on the FDA in setting the parameters for acceptable trial practices. In a
number of the cases identified, decisions about acceptable trial disclosure prac-
ticeswere justified through express or impliedFDAguidance.Most overt in this
regard was the application of the FDA pre-emption doctrine to preclude tort li-
ability for medical device trials, as adjudicated in Parks v HOC.132 The extent
to which pre-emption applies to potential tort actions stemming from clinical
125 White v. Kennedy Krieger Institute 221Md.App. 601 (Md. Feb. 26, 2015).
126 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute 782 A.2d 807 (Md. Aug. 16, 2001).
127 Weinstein v. KirkmanNo. C13-0769-JCC, 2013WL 12121125 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 16, 2013).
128 Kinkaid v. InzucchiNoNNHCV126035005S, 2013WL 5496537 (Conn. Super. Ct., Sept. 16, 2013).
129 Kernan et al., supra note 92.
130 Nguyen v. New Link Genetics Corp. 297 F.Supp.3d 472 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018).
131 This was discussed in an article published soon after trial results were published: ‘Newlink has never
explained why it didn’t allow independent data monitors to conduct a futility analysis of the algenpantucel-
L phase III study, but the absence of one has been profitable for NewLink CEO Charles Link Jr’.:
Adam Feuerstein, NEWLINK PANCREATIC CANCER VACCINE FAILS, MAY BE HARMFUL THESTREET (2016),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13564107/1/newlink-pancreatic-cancer-vaccine-fails-and-maybe-even
-harms-patients.html (accessed Feb 1, 2019).
132 Parks v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp.No. 8:15-cv-75, 2015WL 3581714 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 27, 2015).
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drug trials operating under an Investigational New Drug application is unclear
but warrants further consideration.133
In situations outside of the constitutional doctrine of pre-emption, courts still relied
on FDA actions to indicate reasonable or appropriate sponsor actions, For example, in
assessing the materiality of interim data in Sanders v Aveo Pharm, Inc,134 the court was
guided by FDA signals about the reliability of sixmonths’ versus twelvemonths’ of trial
data.
(3) Requirements on plaintiffs to particularize when information was available to clini-
cal trial actors. To the extent that courts have accepted that sponsor companies or
other clinical trial actors have had access to interim trial data, legal obligations to
act on such information have been contingent on specific information about when
information was obtained. This degree of particularization might be very hard for
plaintiffs to satisfy, particularly given precedent for interpreting DSMBmonitoring
activities as falling within the definition of a ‘medical review committee’, and conse-
quently privileged from discovery.135
Several implications flow from the limitations in imposing legal obligations on clin-
ical trial actors to disclose or otherwise use interim trial data. One is the need to be far
more transparent with trial participants and others about the circumstances, if any, in
which theywill be informedabout interim trial data.Given thedouble-blindednatureof
the vast majority of clinical trials and the siloing of information within DSMBs, Partici-
pant Information Sheets promising that participants will be told about ‘significant new
findings developed during the course of research which may relate to a subject’s will-
ingness to continue participation’136 will often be misleading. Instead, the likelihood
of confidentiality until trial completion or termination should be clearly disclosed to
avoid potential deception.137
This raises the questionwhether participant information sheets should specifymore
precisely the circumstances in which a trial might be terminated for efficacy, safety, or
futility. In other words, should participants be told that sponsors and investigators will
only have access to emerging trial information in the event that is reaches apre-specified
stopping rule, and otherwise the information will be siloed in an independent and con-
fidential DSMB?138 This would alleviate concerns about participant deception, and po-
tentially could protect the sponsor and investigators from informed consent claims.
However, specifying the exact circumstances of information disclosure in any mean-
ingful way would be incredibly challenging. For one, data monitoring charters pro-
vide DSMBs with considerable discretion, to accommodate the vast permutations of
133 The Supreme Court has upheld state tort actions based on defective labelling of marketed drugs: Wyeth v.
Levine 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009). This suggests that in the absence of an express legislative pre-emption clause,
such as applies under theMDA, state tort actions based on failure to use or disclose emerging trial information
may be feasible.
134 In re Ariad Pharm. Inc 98 F.Supp 3d 147 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2015).
135 KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Del. 2010).
136 45 CFR 46.116(b)(5).
137 F. G. Miller & D. Wendler, Is it ethical to keep interim findings of randomised controlled trials confidential?, 34 J.
MED. ETHICS 198, 201 (2008).
138 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this article for raising this suggestion.
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potential emerging information. Committing in advance to the circumstances of dis-
closure could actually increase litigation concerns in the event that a DSMB, for po-
tentially valid reasons, determines, for example, that a trial should continue despite
having reached a pre-specified stopping rule. Moreover, stopping rules are technically
complex. Given well-identified challenges in helping participants to understand far
less involved scientific concepts, such as randomization,139 it seems an undue bur-
den on them to understand and accept various stopping rules. While the provision of
information—and the non-provision ofmisleading information—is an important start
for improving trial monitoring practices, more substantive changes are needed.
Most pressingly, it is incumbent on clinical trial actors to work together with the
FDA to build a more extensive ethic of data monitoring. At present, there is little con-
sensus on the range of acceptable stopping boundaries in clinical trials, nor on the cir-
cumstances in which DSMBs may recommend to continue a trial beyond the point at
which a trial reaches such a stopping boundary. As discussed in part two, at least some
clinical trials have adopted highly stringent stopping boundaries, including through the
use of quasi-legal terms such as ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. Given the apparent
judicial reluctance to intervene in decisions related to trial design, self-regulation re-
garding acceptable parameters will be necessary. As a first step, it will be helpful simply
to know the range of currently adopted stopping boundaries in order to assess the cir-
cumstances in which a trial’s design might be considered an outlier.
Another strategy for building up a shared ethic of data monitoring is establishing
opportunities for liaison between DSMBs and IRBs. One possibility is a greater de-
gree of systematic sharing of emerging trial data with the reviewing IRB contingent
on IRB members entering into confidentiality agreements similar to those of DSMB
members. Given IRBmembers are privy to considerable amount of information about
ongoing trials; this should not pose an undue risk to trial validity. However, unfettered
disclosurewould add a potentially large additional responsibility on boards that already
have high workloads.140 Perhaps a more feasible means of developing a shared ethic of
data monitoring would be a requirement for a DSMB to consult with the reviewing
IRB only in the event of a trial reaching a decision-making milestone—most clearly,
on reaching or approaching a pre-specified stopping boundary.141 Other circumstances
thatmight warrant consultation include clear evidence of differences in secondary end-
points, or to accommodate evidenceof an intervention’s efficacyor harm reported from
another clinical trial. Collaborative discussions between theDSMBand IRB in these in-
stances provides opportunities to deliberate on the relevant ethical trade-offs, and pos-
sible strategies formitigatingpossible risks—for example, by allowing a trial to continue
but requiring emerging information tobeprovided toparticipants and/or investigators.
Here, DSMB members would be able to advise the IRB on potential risks that such
a disclosure might have for ongoing scientific validity and the trial’s ability to answer
long-term research questions, while IRBmembers could advise the DSMB on the risks
139 For example,M. Stead et al., ‘Hello, hello—it’s English I speak’!: a qualitative exploration of patients’ understand-
ing of the science of clinical trials, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 664, 669 (2005).
140 Joseph A. Catania et al., Survey of U.S. Human Research Protection Organizations: Workload and Membership,
3 J. EMPIR. RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 57, 69 (2008); Phoebe Friesen, Barbara Redman & Arthur Caplan, Of
Straws, Camels, Research Regulation, and IRBs, THER. INNOV. REGUL. SCI. 2168479018783740 (2018).
141 Eckstein, supra note 13.
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of non-disclosure for the ethical principle of respect for participants.While there are no
‘right’ answers, the deep and deliberative discussions required to assess these courses
of action potentially provides the best opportunity for a thoughtful response.
Greater transparency about DSMB decisions after a trial concludes also could help
to shape agreed data monitoring practices going forward. While some pivotal publica-
tions for clinical trials advise that the trial continued beyond a pre-specified stopping
point, there is variable information on the justification for continuing the trial and the
deliberative processes employed in making such a determination. For example, in one
publication explaining the early termination for efficacy of a treatment for familial ade-
nomatous polyposis, the authors state that:
The data and safety monitoring board (DSMB) reviewed the study at the first interim
analysis of 33 participants.Although the prespecified interim stopping rule had beenmet the at
that point, the DSMB recommended continuation of the study. Study investigators were not
made aware of the results of the interim analysis.The study was stopped after the second
interim analysis of 67 participants by the DSMB because the prespecified stopping rule
for the primary end point was met. (Emphasis added.)
This can be compared with the far more detailed justification by Patel et al for a
DSMB recommendation to continue a trial after it had reached a stopping boundary
for efficacy, which advised:
Early stopping for efficacy was predetermined at a P value< .001 for rejection of the null
hypothesis to declare that the helmet strategy was superior to face mask. At the first in-
terim analysis, the results met criteria for early stoppage of the trial for efficacy; however,
theDSMBdetermined that the trial should continue because the helmetwas not available
for use outside the trial; therefore, non-study patients would not be deprived of the ben-
efit. In addition, the DSMB determined that there were no safety concerns and that the
study had notmet other secondary end points that (e.g., intensive care unit length of stay)
could have been reached with further enrollment. Subsequent to this, the DSMB evalu-
ated work . . . that reported increased mortality among patients treated with face mask
NIV compared with high-flow nasal cannula. The DSMB determined that the face mask
group could have been exposed to increased risk of mortality and because the study al-
ready had met the pre-established criteria for early stoppage, the DSMB recommended
that the studybe stopped forboth efficacy and safety after the enrollmentof 83patients.142
Clearly, this deeper explanation of the monitoring process provides a much greater
opportunity to build a shared ethic of data monitoring going forward.
DSMBs are an important innovation in trial design. As clinical trials continue to in-
crease in number and complexity, clarity about the legal and ethical status of interim
information will be essential. Obligations on clinical trial actors to use or disclose
emerging trial data will need to be consistent with good scientific practice, while also
respecting the rights of current trial participants, patients, and shareholders. This is by
no means intended as a ‘call to arms’ when it comes to litigation against DSMBs—the
potential for which is clearly of concern for existing and future members.143 Rather, a
huge step forwardwill be transparency about when informationwill be disclosed, along
142 Patel et al., supra note 41.
143 DeMets et al., supra note 59.
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with a clear and justifiable framework for assessing the circumstances in which disclo-
sure is justifiable, will be a huge step forward in this regard. In the absence of suchwork,
prima facie disclosure obligations—including those articulated inmany participant in-
formed consent forms—fail to reflect the current reality of judicial willingness to accept
the siloing of information in independent, but largely inscrutable, DSMBs.
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